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How do you respond when an agent is involved in an incident?

For decades, incident response plans were built to account for people and software, each with its own processes and challenges. Software is deterministic; its failures are rooted in code. Humans make mistakes or misbehave, but they can at least try to explain themselves.

AI agents are different from both humans and traditional software. The same instruction produces different actions on two different runs, and asking an agent for an explanation is pointless, as it’s a new output generated after the fact rather than a record of what actually drove the action. 

The non-deterministic nature of agentic activity means one more thing: if a run caused an incident, it doesn’t mean another run will; or that an incident it causes will be the same. 

So what do we do when the clock is running, and the triage points at an agent? First of all, don’t just delete it. You need its memory and transcripts. Also, ideally, you already know the agent's owner, since you’ve followed our agentic governance checklist. You’ll need them, because oftentimes they’re the only ones who can stop the agent.  

Every row in the checklist is a decision someone has to make.

Phase 1: Contain, in the first hour

The agent is suspended

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • A named on-call pulled the agent
  • Suspension requires the owning team's sign-off, even after hours

The suspension covers the queue & trigger, not just the process

  • Owner or Security? Owner
  • Stopping the agent drains queued tasks and disables its schedules and webhooks
  • You stopped the container, but something started it again

The credentials are killed at the issuer

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • Access tokens are invalidated, refresh tokens killed, and sessions dropped
  • The secret was rotated in the config while a live token kept working

Whatever the agent delegates to is stopped

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • You know what this agent spawned or handed work to, and those are down as well
  • The parent is down, but the sub-agents carry on

The business owner is on the call, and the outage a calculated decision

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • Somebody with the authority to accept a broken process is present and says so
  • Security suspends and the business restores it an hour later without writing anything down

The state is captured before everything restarts.

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • Memory contents, session transcripts, tool-call history and the running config are snapshotted before restart
  • A clean image goes out, deleting the evidence

Phase 2: Scope

You have every run of the agent listed

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • An enumerated set of runs with corresponding triggers
  • You only looked at the alert transcript

Two runs are not assumed to have done the same thing

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • Each run's tool calls are read separately
  • One transcript is treated as representative of all runs

The scope window includes time before the alert

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • Your scope starts at the last change you can trust
  • The scope window starts when the alert is fired

The entry point is named, and you know if it is still open

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • The document, tool, or MCP server that carried the instruction is known, along with everyone else who reads it
  • Containment stops at the agent and not the source of its payload

Reads are scoped as well as writes

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • You know what the agent pulled and how much of it, by volume
  • The deletion was investigated, but not the export before it

Identities sharing the blast radius are checked

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • Other agents on the same credential, server, or memory store are examined
  • The investigation is scoped to the one alerting agent

Phase 3: Eradicate and recover

Memory and retrieval stores are cleaned, not just the agent

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • Poisoned entries are removed from long-term memory and from every index the agent reads, including reworded versions
  • The agent is restarted and reads the payload again

Reversals happen in a decided order, with named owners

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • A sequenced list of undo actions exists, each with a person against it
  • Several people undo things at once, and changes are impossible to isolate

Irreversible actions get a human remediation

  • Owner or Security? Owner
  • Someone is responsible for correcting the actions
  • "Cannot be undone" is written down instead of action items

The config is rebuilt from a known-good version

  • Owner or Security? Owner
  • The config is restored from a stored version, with the diff kept
  • Someone edits the system prompt until the behavior stops

Restart is gated on a written condition

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • What has to happen before the agent runs again is agreed to, in writing
  • The agent is back because the business needed it back

It runs supervised before it runs free

  • Owner or Security? Owner
  • A defined period at reduced scope or with write approvals, and someone reviews the transcripts
  • Full autonomy is restored the moment the agent is declared clean

Phase 4: Close out

You can say what it did and on whose authority, or say plainly that you cannot

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • There’s a written answer for each material action including named gaps
  • A narrative assembled from inference

Notification is assessed on what the agent did, not only on what leaked

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • Someone checks if it sent emails, changed records, or made decisions
  • Only the data exposure question is interesting to stakeholders

The people the agent acted toward are told

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • If the agent wrote to a customer or acted in their name, they hear it from you
  • The incident stays internal because no data left the building

The fix is a permission change or an intent change

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • The corrective action is visible in the agent's scopes or intent statement
  • The system prompt is edited to tell the agent not to do this again

The same class is checked across the fleet

  • Owner or Security? Security
  • You ask which other agents hold that tool, read that store, or run that pattern. Then you fix those
  • One agent fixed

The gaps go back into the other checklists

  • Owner or Security? Both
  • What you couldn't answer becomes a logging item, what you couldn't stop becomes a permission item
  • The post-mortem is a document that gets filed and forgotten